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Abstract
The structure of some household surveys allows the evaluation of social programs which are
implemented gradually by municipality and whose objectives are measurable by survey vari-
ables. Such evaluations do not require over sampling of areas in which the program was im-
plemented, nor the application of additional questionnaires, while providing baseline data and
non-experimental comparison groups. We use the PNAD survey to evaluate the impact of the
Program for the Eradication of Child Labor on child labor, schooling, and income for munici-
palities which entered the program from 1997–1999. We present results both from a reﬂexive
comparison and from matching municipalities to form a comparison group and measuring the
difference in differences (D in D). Only the reduction of child labor is robust to the D in D anal-
ysis, while the reﬂexive results also demonstrate a signiﬁcant increase in school attendance. We
ﬁnd the program to be more effective in smaller municipalities as suggested by Rocha (1999).
Keywords: Brazil, Child Labor, Impact evaluation, Propensity score matching
JEL Codes: I32, I38
Resumo
A estrutura de algumas pesquisas por amostragem facilita a avaliac ¸˜ ao de programas sociais
que s˜ ao gradualmente implementados por munic´ ıpio e cujos objetivos s˜ ao mensur´ aveis por
vari´ aveis da pesquisa. Tais avaliac ¸˜ oes n˜ ao exigem a sobre-amostragem de ´ areas em que o
programa foi implementado, nem a aplicac ¸˜ ao de question´ arios adicionais, enquanto fornecem
dados de baseline e grupos de comparac ¸˜ ao n˜ ao-experimental. Usamos a PNAD para avaliar o
impacto do PETI no trabalho infantil, na escolaridade e na renda dos munic´ ıpios que entraram
no programa entre 1997 e 1999. Apresentamos resultados de uma comparac ¸˜ ao com a baseline
e tamb´ em de uma comparac ¸˜ ao com um grupo de munic´ ıpios formado por matching. No ´ ultimo
caso, medimos a diferenc ¸a em diferenc ¸as (D em D). Apenas a reduc ¸˜ ao do trabalho infantil ´ e
robusta ` a an´ alise D em D, enquanto os resultados de comparac ¸˜ ao s´ o com a baseline tamb´ em
demonstram um aumento signiﬁcativo na freq¨ uˆ encia escolar. Conclu´ ımos que o programa ´ e
mais efetivo em munic´ ıpios menores como sugerido por Rocha (1999).
Palavras-chave: Brasil, Trabalho infantil, Avaliac ¸˜ ao de impacto, Propensity score matching
Classiﬁcac ¸˜ ao JEL: I32, I38
11 Introduction
Any social policy or government program should be evaluated. Spending public resources
without knowing how they are being used, and what their impact is, is very poor public policy.
Process evaluations tell us how these resources were spent and are usually performed closely
with day to day monitoring of the program’s execution. Without them there is no way to
identify and correct blunders in program management. Process evaluations do not, however,
tell us what good the program did. This is the territory of impact evaluations.
The ideal social program is designed and implemented with an evaluation strategy that al-
lows for a baseline, a control group, and clear, quantiﬁable program goals (Baker, 2000; Raval-
lion, 2001). In the real world this rarely happens. More often than not, political imperatives
and the urgency in attacking social problems do not allow for time and resources to be spent
designing and implementing an ideal evaluation strategy. The costs involved are usually quite
large and well intentioned program directors frequently prefer to spend their money directly on
the program’s beneﬁciaries rather than on designing and implementing questionnaires to eval-
uate their programs. Furthermore, some of the components involved, such as control groups,
are often unacceptable from ethical and political points of view. It is difﬁcult to justify that
part of a generation be condemned to a lack-luster future to create a control group for program
evaluation.
However, most countries have readily available a statistical information system (e.g. a
household survey) that is collected with other objectives and may be used to evaluate social
programs. An evaluation based on household surveys will be performed on a more aggregate
level than an evaluation speciﬁcally designed for the project. However, the need for evaluations
is great and the information available in the household surveys is sufﬁcient to measure program
impacts.
The objective of this article is to use Brazilian household surveys to evaluate the impact of a
socialprogramthatwasnotdesignedwithevaluationinmind. Thisisdoneasaproofofconcept
that robust evaluations with baseline data can be performed using only household survey data.
The program is the Program for Eradication of Child Labor (Programa de Erradicac ¸˜ ao do
Trabalho Infantil — PETI) and the survey is the Brazilian National Household Sample Survey
(Pesquisa Nacional por Amostragem de Domic´ ılios — PNAD).
A favorable World Bank (2001) evaluation of PETI used qualitative methods as well as a
quantitative study of twelve municipalities (six with PETI and six without) for which special
data was collected. Cardoso and Souza (2003) evaluate the effect of conditional cash transfers
on child labor and school attendance in Brazil by using the 2000 census data. They ﬁnd that
transfers increase school attendance while having no effect on child labor. However, as pointed
out in Rawlings and Rubio (2003) these studies as well as all other evaluations of PETI lack
baseline data. Hence, they are subject to uncorrectable selection biases.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains how the sampling base for the PNAD
is constructed, describes the necessary panel-like characteristic which it contains, and describes
the PETI data which was used. Section 3 describes the propensity score matching methodology,
its possible biases, and how to correct for them. Section 4 presents the results from our impact
evaluation and Section 5 concludes.
22 Data
The PNAD is a cross-section of households throughout Brazil. To reduce costs, the households
which are surveyed in the PNAD are not chosen randomly from all those in Brazil. Instead,
they are chosen based on a three stage procedure.
The ﬁrst stage is the choice of municipalities to be surveyed. This is accomplished by ﬁrst
dividing all the municipalities in Brazil (more than 5000) into three categories: (i) metropolitan
areas, (ii) auto-representative, and (iii) non-auto-representative. The ﬁrst two consist of large
and medium sized municipalities which are automatically included in the PNAD with probabil-
ity one. The third category (to which most belong) contains the smaller municipalities which
are sampled with probability proportional to their population. The classiﬁcation and choice
of which municipalities are to be surveyed is performed only once during the period between
censuses.
During the second stage, the census sectors which will be surveyed are chosen from within
themunicipalitieswhichhavealreadybeenselected. Thesesectorsarealsomaintainedthrough-
out the period between censuses. However, areas experiencing rapid population growth will
often generate new census sectors which may be included in the PNAD.
In the third stage, the households to be surveyed are chosen from within each census sector.
Each year, the households which were interviewed are removed from the PNAD’s register and
new households are selected for surveying. Therefore, no household is ever surveyed more than
once.
Hence, the PNAD consists of a panel of about 800 municipalities, which is ﬁxed between
censuses, and a cross-section of households within these municipalities, which changes yearly.
This allows one to estimate the impact of a social program on the variables measured by the
PNAD when the program is implemented gradually at the level of municipalities.
To complement the PNAD household data, we have data from the Ministry of Social Wel-
fare (Minist´ erio da Assistˆ encia Social — MAS) detailing which municipalities received PETI
and their year of entrance. It is unknown which households from the PNAD participate in
PETI, so the only measurable impacts are aggregate ones on municipalities. However, if a
PETI child stops working only to have a non-PETI child assume his job, PETI has not been
successful. Hence, the restriction to only measure aggregate municipal effects avoids the pos-
sibility of positively evaluating PETI in a municipality where child labor didn’t decrease, but
those children in PETI stopped working.
3 Propensity Score Matching
We can measure part of the impact of PETI by reﬂexively measuring the changes in the vari-
ables of interest in PETI municipalities.1 Such a measurement describes the changes, but does
not attribute them to the program. In order to exclusively attribute any impacts to PETI, we
must establish either an experimental control group or a non-experimental comparison group
against which we can measure the impact of the program. In the case of PETI, MAS did not
randomly choose in which municipalities to implement the program from a larger set of munic-
ipalities targeted to receive PETI, hence we cannot pursue an experimental approach. We can,
1A reﬂexive measurement compares the values at a given time after program implementation with the values
at a previous time before implementation (a baseline).
3however, generate a non-experimental comparison group by propensity score matching (PSM)
PNAD municipalities in PETI with other PNAD municipalities which are not in PETI.
PSM techniques are often used on data which do not possess a baseline. In such cases it is
necessary to ﬁnd instruments which affect the probability of participation in a given program,
but do not affect the variables of interest, which the program intends to improve. These in-
struments are then used to match observations (municipalities in our case) which receive the
program (the treatment group) with observations that do not receive the program to form a com-
parison group. Any differences between the variables of interest in the treatment group and the
comparison group are attributed to the program impact. This is a typical matching procedure
which uses just one cross-section of data.
However, the PNAD provides a baseline for PETI since it is performed annually. Hence,
we can match municipalities the year before they enter PETI on instruments which affect the
probability of participation and on the variables of interest. This is important in the case of
PETI, because the criteria by which municipalities are chosen are identical with the variables
of interest.
Closely following Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) we assume that each mu-
nicipality has two possible outcomes for a given variable of interest, Y0 and Y1, where the ﬁrst
refers to the absence of PETI and the second to its presence. If we deﬁne a dummy variable,
D, which takes the value one when a municipality receives PETI and zero otherwise, we only
observe Y = Y1D + Y0(1 − D) for each municipality.
We would like to measure the impact of PETI, ∆ = Y1 − Y0. Estimation of this expression
using unconditional averages is not recommended since we only observe Y0 for municipalities
that do not receive PETI and this may not be a good estimate of Y0 for municipalities that do
receive PETI.
We can try to observe the mean impact of PETI conditional on characteristics of the munic-
ipality, X, given by
∆(X) = E(∆|X,D = 1) = E(Y1|X,D = 1) − E(Y0|X,D = 1). (1)
We can use the data for municipalities which participate in PETI to calculate E(Y1|X, D = 1),
however E(Y0|X,D = 1) remains inaccessible. Generally, the equivalence of E(Y0|X,D = 1)
and E(Y0|X,D = 0) is assumed to allow the estimation of
ˆ ∆(X) = E(ˆ ∆|X) = E(Y1|X,D = 1) − E(Y0|X,D = 0). (2)
If the number of distinct values of all the variables in X is very large, it becomes difﬁcult
to ﬁnd municipalites with characteristics equivalent to those in the program in order to estimate
Y0 conditional on X. However, PSM relies on a theorem of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to
replace the assumed equivalence E(Y0|X,D = 1) = E(Y0|X,D = 0) by E(Y0|P(X),D =
1) = E(Y0|P(X),D = 0), where P(X) is the probability of participation in PETI. This
theorem allows us to replace X by P(X) in Eq. (2) to obtain
ˆ ∆(P(X)) = E(ˆ ∆|P(X)) = E(Y1|P(X),D = 1) − E(Y0|P(X),D = 0), (3)
where P(X) is estimated by a probit model. Matching is now performed on a single number.





ˆ ∆(P(X))dF(P(X)|D = 1)
Z
K
dF(P(X)|D = 1), (4)
4where K represents the region in probability-space over which the impact is being averaged,
and the argument K on the left hand side implies averaging over this region.
The resulting estimate from matching on the propensity score ˆ ∆(P(X)) contains a bias,
B(P(X)) = E(Y0|P(X),D = 1) − E(Y0|P(X),D = 0),
such that ˆ ∆(P(X)) = ∆(P(X)) + B(X). The average of this bias term is decomposed into
three components (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd, 1998, eq. 14, p. 1030). The ﬁrst term
arises if we calculate ˆ ∆(K) in regions K where there is no common support for PETI and non-
PETI municipalities. This means that a given municipality may not have a match with similar
characteristics and therefore should not be used in the estimate of program impact. We can
eliminate this bias by requiring that all matches be made within a limited radius of the PETI
municipalities’ propensity scores as in the “propensity-score caliper” of Dehejia and Wahba
(1998) used by Jalan and Ravallion (2003):
C[P(Xi)] = {P(Xj)| kP(Xi) − P(Xj)k < } (5)
Municipalities which do not manage a match are not used in the estimate of ˆ ∆(K) in Eq (4).
The second component of the bias term is generated by the difference in the density of PETI
and non-PETI municipalities as a function of the propensity score. We eliminate this bias by
re-weighting the density of non-PETI municipalities through matching. We obtain Y1 for each
PETI municipality that is matched to one or more non-PETI municipalities. We then calculate
an average value of Y0 for the non-PETI municipalities matched to that municipality, ﬁnally














where P is the number of matched PETI municipalities, Non P is the number of non-PETI
municipalities, Nm is the number of observations in municipality m, and Wnm deﬁnes the re-
weighting of the non-PETI municipalities. For nearest neighbor matching Wnm equals one for
the nearest neigbor and zero for all others. In general, we weight matches by one over the
number of matches obtained for municipality m. This re-weighting of the non-PETI munici-
palities eliminates the second component of bias. The ﬁnal component of the bias term is not
eliminated by matching and is the true selection bias, B(P(X)).
Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) ﬁnd that although B(P(X)) may not be zero
for a given cross-section, if it is constant in time an accurate estimate of δ∆(t) ≡ ∆(t) −∆(t−1),
for a municipality which enters PETI in year t is given by the difference in differences (D in























where: P (t)(X(t−1)) represents the probability of a municipality entering PETI in year t based
on its characteristics in year t−1 and will be referred to as P (t) in the future for brevity; D(t) is
one if a municipality enters PETI in year t, zero if it is not in PETI in year t, and missing if it has
5entered PETI before year t; and Y
(t−1)
0 represents the value of Y in year t−1 for municipalities
in which PETI has not been implemented in year t − 1. The term in brackets, B(t−1)(P (t)),
is directly calculable from the data in year t − 1, because PETI has not been implemented
yet and all municipalities used in the calcuation have D(t−1) = 0 and hence Y (t−1) = Y
(t−1)
0 .
Reiterating, this estimate is accurate if B(t)(P (t)) = B(t−1)(P (t)).






























































to show how PETI’s impact as measured by D in D can be written as the difference between
the reﬂexive estimate of its impact, δY (D(t) = 1), and the change in the untreated comparison
group, δY (D(t) = 0). We report the averaged version of this impact, δ∆(t)(K), obtained by
replacing Y1m and Y0n in Eq. 6 by δYm(D(t) = 1) and δYn(D(t) = 0), respectively.
4 Results
4.1 The PNAD
Table 1 reports the number of municipalities in all of Brazil and the number of municipalities
surveyed by the PNAD that entered PETI from 1997–1999. The data suggest that the munici-
palities in the PNAD provide good coverage of the municipalities which received PETI.
We must ensure that the PNAD is providing a similar cross-section of households within
each municipality from year to year. To this end we perform t-tests for the equality of means
between the average adult education the year before entering PETI and the year of entrance.
Adult education should not change signiﬁcantly from one year to the next, hence any differ-
ences come from sampling errors. Any municipalities in which the null hypothesis of equal
means can be rejected at a signiﬁcance level of 5% are excluded from the probit and are not
used when matching, including PETI municipalities. The numbers of excluded municipalities
are 88, 58, and 74 for the years from 1996–7, 1997–8, and 1998–9, respectively. Two PETI
municipalities are excluded for the 1997-8 period and none are excluded in the other periods.
The PNAD is a survey which provides sampling weights and information on the primary
sampling units (PSUs). When measuring the impact of PETI we use neither the sampling
weights nor the PSUs. The use of the weights would be an error since our goal is not to
extrapolatetheimpactofPETIasifitwasimplementedthroughoutBrazil, butrathertomeasure
its impact on the speciﬁc municipalities in which it was implemented. The use of the PSU
information would be acceptable, however, we prefer to treat each observation as independent,
rather than the PSUs. Therefore, the estimates are performed using analytic weights (cell-mean
weights) where the weights are the number of observations in the municipality, not the number
of PSUs (Nm in Eq. 6). This approach causes municipalities with more observations (or PSUs)
6to have a larger effect on the estimates of PETI’s impact. This is troublesome since it has
been suggested (Rocha, 1999) that PETI would be more effective if it were implemented on a
smaller scale (neighborhoods) rather than a larger one. We resolve this problem by including a
dummy variable in our regressions which indicates which PETI municipalities have more than
800 observations in the PNAD.
The main objective of PETI is to reduce child labor in targeted degrading or dangerous
activities, as enumerated in appendix II of its orientation guide (MEAS, 2002). These targeted
activities include working in coal-pits, construction, any work with dangerous objects or chem-
icals, and many more. Households with a per-capita income less than one half of the minimum
salary are preferentially targeted. In PETI households, the children are required to attend school
and after school programs, and to stop working. Further details of PETI’s functioning can be
found in MEAS (2002) and Rocha (1999).
In order to assess the efﬁcacy of the program several variables measured by the PNAD are
used. Child labor for children from 10–14 years old is measured, including the type of labor,
which allows the classiﬁcation into targeted rural and urban activities and non-targeted activ-
ities. School attendance is measured for all respondents, although we only measure the effect
on children from 7–14 years of age. Years of study is measured for all respondents, allowing
the calculation of how far off track children from 7–14 are from their expected educational
level, based on age. Household income is reported, which allows the calculation of per-capita
household income and the percentage of households with per-capita income less than 25% of
the minimum salary.
These variables are used to measure the impact of PETI on child labor, schooling, poverty,
and income. The reﬂexive changes measured in these variables for PETI municipalities are
independent of the probit and matching results given below and are reported in columns 2,
4, and 6 of Tables 3 and 4 for municipalities which entered PETI from 1997–1999 and those
which entered in 1998, respectively.
4.2 Matching
As discussed in Section 3, since our ﬁnal goal is a D in D measurement, we can match based
on the same variables on which we would like to measure the impact of PETI. We present two
different probit models which are used to determine the probability of a given municipality
entering PETI.
The ﬁrst probit speciﬁcation in the left panel of Table 2 is poorly adjusted, but jointly
signiﬁcant to 3%. The variables used in the probit represent average municipal values and are:
per-capita income; Theil’s T measure of income inequality; average adult education in years
for adults 25 and older; percentage of illiterate adults 25 and older; percentage of children 7–
14 who are more than one year behind in school; percentage of children 10–14 who work in
urban and rural activities targeted by PETI and who work in untargeted activities; percentage
of people who live in urban as opposed to rural areas; and the type of census zone to which
the municipality belongs. These variables are used in the hope that a comparison group can be
formed with the same poverty, inequality, and educational deﬁciencies, as well as similar child
labor levels, as the municipalities that receive PETI.
Three variables in the left panel of Table 2 are signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcient of income demon-
strates that the higher the per-capita income is the less likely a municipality is to enter PETI.
This is to be expected if we assume that children are more likely to work if their family needs
7their earnings. The large positive coefﬁcient of not attending school shows that the smaller the
percentage of children going to school, the higher the probability of entering PETI. Again, this
is an expected result since children who work are less likely to attend school. And ﬁnally, be-
ing in a non-auto-representative municipality signiﬁcantly decreases the probability of entering
PETI. We used many combinations of child labor variables in an attempt to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
coefﬁcient for child labor, but found none.
Although the model is poorly adjusted, one can see in columns 1 through 3 in Table 32 that
the comparison group formed by a simple nearest neighbor PSM using this probit speciﬁcation
reasonably reproduces the PETI treatment group. Income and the high levels of child labor
could not be reproduced in the comparison group, which is not surprising since none of the
child labor variables were signiﬁcant in the probit which we used.
The second probit speciﬁcation in the right panel of Table 2 is better adjusted than the ﬁrst
and is jointly signiﬁcant to less than 0.1%. The speciﬁcation is similar to the ﬁrst, with the
exception of two variables: off track now represents the average number of years that a child
7-14 is behind in school, rather than a dummy variable; and the child labor variables have been
replaced with adult labor in activities targeted by PETI.
This model also has only three variables with signiﬁcant coefﬁcients. The coefﬁcients of
non-auto-representativeandnotattendingschoolexhibitthesamebehaviorasintheﬁrstmodel.
The coefﬁcient of the new variable, adult labor in targeted activities, is signiﬁcant to 1% and
demonstrates that the higher the incidence of adult labor in jobs considered degrading for chil-
dren, the greater the likelihood that a municipality will enter PETI. This indicates that MAS did
not necessarily target municipalities with high incidences of child labor in degrading activities,
but rather municipalities where there was a high risk of children being employed in dangerous
activities because of high demand for such labor.
Looking at columns 1 through 3 in Table 4 one sees that the comparison group formed by
PSM with this probit is excellent. The PSM was performed with up to four nearest-neighbors
with propensity scores within a radius of 0.005 of the PETI municipality’s propensity score.
Three matchable PETI municipalities failed to ﬁnd matches because of this common support
restriction. Additionally, two other PETI municipalities had more than 800 observations in the
PNAD and are not represented in the table.
4.3 Difference in Differences
The sixth and last columns of Tables 3 and 4 contain results pertaining to a purely reﬂexive
estimate of the impact of PETI and the D in D estimate, respectively. In both tables, column 6
minus column 7 gives column 8 as demonstrated in Eq. (8).
Table 3 contains the results from aggregating all municipalities that entered PETI from
1997–1999. The variables on which the impact of PETI is measured are described in Sec-
tion 4.1. There are ﬁve statistically signiﬁcant results from the reﬂexive estimate and two sta-
tistically signiﬁcant results from the D in D estimate. We only comment on those results which
are signiﬁcant to at least 5%. Both estimates show a decrease in all child labor of approximately
8 percentage points which is signiﬁcant to 1% and a decrease in child labor in targeted areas of
about 4 percentage points, signiﬁcant to 5%. The reﬂexive results also demonstrate an increase
2The same probit speciﬁcation was used as that in the left panel of Table 2 with data for municipalities that en-
tered PETI from 1997–9. There are 2092 observations in column 1 because each municipality receives a different
propensity score and contributes different data depending on which year the probit is being run.
8in school attendance of about 4 percentage points, signiﬁcant to 1%. Although not reported
in the table, the four PETI municipalities which had more than 800 observations in the PNAD
showed no signiﬁcant PETI impacts, neither for the reﬂexive nor the D in D estimates.
Table 4 contains the results of the impact evaluation for the municipalities which entered
PETI in 1998. The reﬂexive results show a signiﬁcant increase in per-capita income, a 6.9
percentage point increase in school attendance, signiﬁcant to 1%, and a decrease of about 10
percentage points from 22 to 12% in all child labor, signiﬁcant to 5%. The D in D results show
a 10.8 percentage point decrease in all child labor, signiﬁcant to 1%, as well as a 4 percentage
point decrease in targeted child labor, signiﬁcant to 10%, both attributable to PETI.
Although not reported, the two PETI municipalities which had more than 800 observations
in the PNAD in 1997 had an increase in per-capita income of R$15, signiﬁcant to 10%, based
on the reﬂexive estimate. However, the D in D estimate yielded many disturbing results: the
percentage of people living with a per-capita income less than one quarter of the minimum
salary rose 8.4 percentage points; the average number of years that a child is behind in school
rose 0.25; and the percentage of children who attend school fell 5.2 percentage points; all sig-
niﬁcant to 5%. Rocha (1999) suggests that PETI be targeted not at the municipal level, but at
the neighborhood level to ensure proper targeting and delivery of beneﬁts. Our results demon-
strate that PETI is more effective in smaller municipalities, perhaps for the reasons suggested
by Rocha (1999).
The two matching models reported in this paper have a large overlap in the data which is
used to measure the impact of PETI, since 60% of the PETI municipalities which entered the
program from 1997–1999 entered in 1998. This explains the similarity of the reﬂexive results
which show increases in school attendance and decreases in child labor. However, we use
different probit models and matching criteria on the different data sets. Despite these differ-
ences the models agree that PETI has signiﬁcantly decreased child labor in the municipalities
in which it was implemented as measured by a D in D estimate. These general results are
robust to variations in the number of nearest-neighbors matched from 1–5 (and maybe more)
and variations in the radius of matching from 0.005–0.025 for the municipalities which entered
PETI in 1998 and are available from the authors upon request.
5 Conclusion
We have exploited the properties of the PNAD to perform an impact evaluation of the Program
for the Eradication of Child Labor (PETI) in Brazil. Our results demonstrate that PETI works
better in smaller municipalities in line with suggestions by Rocha (1999) that the program
be implemented on smaller scales to improve its effectiveness. PETI has a signiﬁcant impact
on the reduction of child labor as measured by a difference in differences (D in D) estimate.
Although a reﬂexive estimate shows signiﬁcant increases in school attendance, these results do
not survive the D in D analysis. This may be a result of our lack of knowledge of what other
social programs have been implemented in the various municipalities. For example, Bolsa
Escola, which provides monthly stipends for children to attend school, but has no requirement
that these children not work, could be masking the effect of PETI on school attendance if
the municipalities in the comparison group are receiving this program. In order to correct
such a problem it would be necessary to gather data about which municipalities receive which
social programs. Then these municipalities could be kept out of the comparison group, or a
9more complex matching could be performed which measures the relative impacts of different
programs.
The structure of the PNAD was particularly well suited to measuring the impact of PETI,
since the most important effects of the program (reducing child labor and increasing school
attendance) only have signiﬁcance on a municipality wide scale. Hence, the aggregation of the
data was not detrimental to evaluating PETI. However, an oversampling of the municipalities
which receive PETI, with an additional oversampling of PETI participants within those munic-
ipalities, and a question identifying which households receive PETI could be extremely useful
in future evaluations of PETI (Jalan and Ravallion, 2003). First, it might become possible to
measure impacts on poverty and income for PETI households. Second, the information could
be used to monitor the targeting of PETI within the municipalities. Also, the grouped estimator
of Dehejia (2003) could be used to predict which municipalities might respond better to PETI
even before implementation. However, it is important to note that we have managed to perform
an evaluation without the need for oversampling or any extra costs or questions beyond those
which already exist in the PNAD.
In Brazil, our methodology can be used to evaluate any social program: which is imple-
mented gradually on the scale of municipalities; which intends to affect variables measured by
the PNAD; and whose impact is only effective on a community-wide scale. Generally speak-
ing, any household survey with a panel characteristic similar to that of the PNAD and with a
sufﬁcient number of variables of interest can be used to perform a similar impact evaluation.
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11Table 1: Number of Municipalities that entered PETI by year.
All municipalities PNAD municipalities
Year Number Percent Number Percent
1997 33 21.57 7 17.50
1998 93 60.78 24 60.00
1999 27 17.65 9 22.50
Total 153 100.00 40 100.00
12Table 2: Two probit speciﬁcations for municipalities which entered PETI in 1998.
Variable Coefﬁcient Std. Error Variable Coefﬁcient Std. Error
Income (R$) −0.00438 0.00267∗ = −0.00417 0.00262
Theil’s T −0.06819 0.55638 = 0.02479 0.56244
Adult Education 0.07009 0.17079 = 0.09020 0.17541
Adult Illiteracy 1.87471 1.47229 = 1.83464 1.53788
Off Track > 1 −1.40419 1.02196 Off Track −0.37360 0.28870
No School 3.56533 1.44443† = 3.30303 1.48183†
Child Labor Adult Labor
Targeted Urban −1.89193 4.66214 Targeted 3.62463 1.15713‡
Targeted Rural 1.42717 1.29894
Untargeted 0.66858 0.91179
Urban area 0.69960 0.59431 = 0.08130 0.56738
Census Zone =
Metropolitan — — = — —
Auto rep. 0.05960 0.34629 = 0.01996 0.34867
Non-auto rep. −0.56402 0.32165∗ = −0.60963 0.32540∗
Intercept −2.00668 1.03688∗ = −2.62992 1.06671†
LR χ2(12) 23.73 LR χ2(10) 31.51
p-value 0.0221 p-value 0.0005
Source: IBGE/PNAD 1997; MAS/PETI. Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. ‡, †, and * represent signiﬁ-
cance at the level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. An ‘=’ in the right ‘Variable’ column means that the variable
is the same as that in the left ‘Variable’ column.
13Table 3: Baseline data and PETI impact for municipalities that entered PETI from 1997–1999
and have 800 or fewer observations in the PNAD.
Year before entering Entrance year δY PETI
Non-PETI PETI Comp. PETI Comp. PETI Comp. Impact






























































































Obs. n = 2092 n = 34 n = 38 n = 34 n = 38 n = 34 n = 38 n = 38
Source: IBGE/PNADs 1996–1999; MAS/PETI. Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. ‡, †, and ∗ in the last
three columns represent signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Propensity score matching was
performed by using the probit speciﬁcation in the left panel of Table 2 estimated for all municipalities which
entered PETI from 1997–9. A simple nearest neighbor matching was performed.
14Table 4: Baseline data and PETI impact for municipalities that entered PETI in 1998 and have
800 or fewer observations in the PNAD.
1997 Values 1998 Values δY PETI
Non-PETI PETI Comp. PETI Comp. PETI Comp. Impact



























































































Obs. n = 707 n = 17 n = 17 n = 17 n = 17 n = 17 n = 17 n = 17
Source: IBGE/PNADs 1997 and 1998; MAS/PETI. Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. ‡, †, and ∗ in the
last three columns represent signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Propensity score matching
was performed by using the probit speciﬁed in the right panel of Table 2. The matching was performed with
up to four nearest neighbors whose propensity scores were within 0.005 above or below that of the matched
PETI municipality. Three PETI municipalities were not matched because of this last restriction.
15